10 May 2007
3c. Turning our attention now to the turbulent and painful history of the temporal power of the Popes, we note that their diplomatic activity was dictated only in part by temporal considerations; the religious interest always remained uppermost, that is to say, the care of the spiritual issues of the Church.7 This appears, for example, from the so-called “investiture controversy” over the appointment of bishops, which culminated in the confrontation between the Emperor Henry IV and Pope Gregory VII - the famous episode at Canossa in January 1077; this dispute was eventually concluded in 1122 by the Concordat of Worms between Pope Callistus II and Emperor Henry V. Another example would be the organization of the Crusades, led by Christian sovereigns at the request of the Popes, for the liberation of Christ’s Sepulchre, which in the year 636 had fallen into the hands of the Muslims (the first Crusade was in 1096 - the seventh and last in 1270). And how can we fail to mention the Congress of Münster, concluded in 1648 with the peace of Westphalia (which, incidentally, was not accepted by the Holy See). This put an end to the Thirty Years’ War between Catholic and Protestant sovereigns and established the principle “Cuius regio eius et religio” (in other words, the religion of a state is to be that of the sovereign).
Another aspect that I consider worthy of note is this: the constant interface between papal diplomacy and the politics and diplomacy of States, if only from one particular standpoint, contributed to the ever increasing refinement of the Holy See’s diplomatic instruments. From one particular standpoint, I say: because even when the Apostolic See was involved in political or territorial issues, neither the States concerned, nor the Holy See herself, could ever accept that she would divest herself of the inalienable features of her religious nature: for this reason the Holy See could never carry out a military policy of dominance, even less one of conquest, comparable with that of a temporal State. To be sure, looking at the entire history of the temporal power of the Popes, one can hardly fail to see it as the troubled journey of an earthenware vessel among a multitude of iron vessels, which ultimately could only end in its shattering.
3d. With the “Breach of the Porta Pia” in 1870, the Papal States were liquidated, and the “Roman question” emerged, the essence of which might be expressed as follows: What internationally valid and effective guarantees could the Pope have, as the supreme authority of the Catholic Church in the world, for his independence and freedom from political coercion of any kind? The question was resolved by the Lateran Treaty of 11 February 1929 between the Holy See and Italy. This introduced a second solid pillar of papal diplomacy: one that is not only theological but also a matter of positive international law.
The Treaty enunciates two essential principles of Vatican diplomacy.
First Principle: Recognition of the sovereignty of the Holy See: “Italy recognizes the sovereignty of the Holy See in the international arena as an inherent attribute of her nature, in conformity with her tradition and with the demands of her mission in the world” (as worded in Article 2).
Second Principle: The recognition of the “exclusive and absolute power and sovereign jurisdiction over the Vatican as presently constituted” (Article 3), and this “so as to ensure the Holy See’s absolute and visible independence and to guarantee her unquestionable sovereignty in the international arena as well” (as worded in the Preamble).
With regard to the first principle, two aspects should be carefully considered. The sovereignty of the Holy See is recognized:
a) as an inherent attribute of her nature: and the nature of the Holy See is that of being the supreme organ of the Catholic Church;
b) in conformity with her tradition - I have just indicated certain features of this - and with the demands of her mission in the world: namely that of leading the Church as such and the task of Evangelization.
This first principle is a sufficient motive for many States to enter into diplomatic relations with the Holy See; they recognize her international importance, supported by her historical role in the old and in the modern world, without thereby expressing judgments of a theological nature. Other States, however, prefer to make exclusive reference to the territorial reality of Vatican City State, which corresponds to their own nature; Vatican City is internationally recognized as a State visibly independent from any other, a State which as such guarantees the Holy See inalienable sovereignty in the international arena. The motivation for the attitude of these other States can vary; for some it might be their own non-denominational nature, which prevents them from recognizing the specifically religious aspect of the Holy See (I am thinking especially of Islamic States), but for others it might be their pronounced secular character, which does not recognize any active role for religions on the international stage.
All this notwithstanding, the motivation of different States is not something in which the Holy See should interfere; it remains clear nevertheless that they all wish to establish diplomatic relations with the Holy See not because of the international significance of Vatican City State - which although not negligible, is very small - but rather because of the importance of the Apostolic See, if not among their own population, then certainly on the international stage.